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)
;
)

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20030454-CA

]

vs.

]1

KASEY BURGESS-BEYNON,

]

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Priority No. 2

]

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
This is an appeal of the trial court's failure to quash a bind-over. In this
matter, the trial court broadened the definition of "place of confinement" to include a
police vehicle in comparison to a jail, prison or other facility. In so doing, the court
allowed the State to move the case forward on a felony "destruction of jail property" in
stead of a misdemeanor criminal mischief when the defendant broke the arresting
officer's squad car window after being placed in arrest.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION,
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953,
as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). Kasey Beynon appeals the
final order and judgment of the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Davis County
involving the inappropriately broadened interpretation of the Damage to Jail Statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1953, as amended). (R. at 128, 132). This matter is on
appeal pursuant to State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 938-39 (Utah Ct App. 1997).1 The
Sentence is (Appendix A); the Order denying motion to quash is (Appendix B).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES,
(1)

Whether the trial court properly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418

(1953, as amended) to include a police vehicle?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Ward v. Richfield City,
798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). "Matters of statutory construction are questions of law
that are reviewed for correctness." State v. State. 57 P.3d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
Utah State Const. Art. I, § 12.

1

Utah State Const. Art. I, § 8.

In Sery, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized the validity of a conditional guilty

plea.
2

Utah State Const. Art. I, § 7.

Utah State Const. Art. I, § 24.

State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
State v. Perez, 999 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)
State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

STATEMENTS OF THE CASE,
I.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from Ms. Beynon's motion to quash bindover, where Judge

Kay denied her motion claiming that pursuant to Section 76-8-418 a police cruiser is
within the meaning of "other place of confinement." The court declared that
"confinement" goes beyond just a physical building, and the focus is on the status of the
defendant, not on the place where defendant is being confined. (R. at 128; R at 138, p. at
11). (App. B).
II.

Course of the Proceedings:
Ms. Beynon was charged with Damaging a Jail, in violation of Utah Code

Ann. § 76-8-418 (1953, as amended). (R. at 1). The State alleged and are stipulated to
by defendant that
"On January 31, 2002, a vehicle being driven by defendant was stopped for a
traffic violation. When the officers made contact with defendant, they detected an
odor of alcohol coming from defendant's person. Defendant was asked to
perform several field sobriety tests . Based on those test, it was determined that
defendant was under the influence of alcohol to an extent that defendant could not
safely operate a vehicle.
3

Defendant was taken into custody and placed in the officer's vehicle. Defendant
then became angry and kicked out the rear window of the patrol car.
(R. at 2-3).
On or about May 1, 2002, after a preliminary hearing, the Honorable Rodney S.
Page bound over the defendant. (R. at 40). Based upon the bind over, the defendant
filed a motion to quash bindover or to dismiss the felony count on June 21, 2002. (R. at
49-55); (App. C). The State filed its memorandum in opposition on June 25, 2002. (R.
at 56-59). (App. D). On July 18, 2002, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay heard oral
arguments concerning the meaning of confinement. At the conclusion, the judge
rendered his decision. (R. at 138). (App. E).
Afterwards, on March 6, 2003, the parties entered into a Sery plea. (R. at 123).
And on April 17, 2003, the Court accepted Ms. Beynon's plea and sentenced her, staying
the payment of her fine pending the appeal. (R. at 131-32). On that same date, the Court
signed an order denying motion to quash bindover. (R. at 128); (App. B).

III.

Disposition in Trial Court:
No trial was conducted. On April 17, 2003, the Court sentenced the

defendant on the terms of her Sery conditional plea to have this Court review the trial
court's decision denying the defendant's motion to quash bindover.
IV.

Statements of Fact:
In this matter, the facts are not disputed between the parties. The facts are:

4

On January 31, 2002, a vehicle being driven by defendant was stopped for a
traffic violation. When the officers made contact with defendant, they detected an
odor of alcohol coming from defendant's person. Defendant was asked to
perform several field sobriety tests . Based on those test, it was determined that
defendant was under the influence of alcohol to an extent that defendant could not
safely operate a vehicle.
Defendant was taken into custody and placed in the officer's vehicle. Defendant
then became angry and kicked out the rear window of the patrol car.
(R. at 2-3).
The defendant contends that her breaking the rear window of the police
cruiser was not felonious because it was not a place of confinement as used in Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-418. Rather, she urges this Court to follow precedent authority and
conclude that Ms. Beynon conducted herself disorderly and committed an act of criminal
mischief by damaging the property of another.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
At hand is the "'injury to a jail' statute" as this Court called it in State v.
Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this matter, Ms. Beynon admits breaking
the rear window of a police cruiser. But she contends that breaking a window of a polcie
vehicle is not the same as damaging a jail. The trial court was wrong for construing her
conduct to be in violation of Section 76-8-418.

5

ARGUMENTS
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW STARE DECISIS AND
INAPPROPRIATELY CONCLUDED THAT A JAIL WAS DAMAGED.

In this matter, Ms. Beynon challenges the trial court's interpretation of the
Injury To A Jail statute, Section 76-8-418. The question presented is a question of law
upon undisputed facts pursuant to a Sery conditional plea. Since no deference is
considered on appeal, Ms. Beynon's appeal is de novo and the arguments are reraised in
toto. "Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for
correctness." State v. State. 57 P.3d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); see also, Ward v.
Richfield City. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).

POINT. MS, BEYNON DID NOT VIOLATE SECTION 76-8-418: SHE DID NOT
CAUSE INJURY TO A JAIL FACILITY.

The injury to a jail statute provides, "A person who willfully and
intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public
jail or other place of confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-418 (2002). This Court calls this statute the "'injury to a jail' statute." State
v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this matter, the defendant was
wrongfully charged with committing this offense on the claim that she damaged a police
vehicle alone. (R. at 2-3). The claim is not that she damaged a public jail. The

6

allegation is a stretch-the State prefers this Court to believe that a police vehicle is
somehow to be construed as fitting within the Legislature's intended meaning of "other
place of confinement."
In reviewing the facts of this case, defendant directs this Court to Section
76-5-101 which defines a "Prisoner." There are two situations where one is considered a
"prisoner": (1) when any person is in custody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful
arrest and (2) when he is confined in a jail or other penal institution or a facility used for
confinement of delinquent juveniles operated by the Division of Youth Corrections
regardless of whether the confinement is legal.
In this matter, Defendant was a prisoner of police officers when she was
arrested for DUI and placed into police vehicle. (R. at 2-3). In this matter, Ms. Beynon
was not a confined person of a jail, prison, or other penal institution or facility used for
the confinement of juvenile delinquents. When Ms. Beynon damaged the rear window
of the police cruiser she was only the prisoner of the arresting officer. (R. at 2-3).
The facts of this case stretch the rulings of past decisions of this Court.
In State v. Jairnez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),2 this Court held that the squad
room of the jail was within the meaning of "jail" and it interpreted that "any damage to
the facility" within the plain meaning of "injury" was punishable under Section 76-8418. IcL, at 827; see also, State v. Perez, 999 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). In Perez,

2

Jaimez interpreted the injury to jail statute.
7

the Court of Appeals specifically rejected using the doctrine of ejusdem generis to
interpret the injury to a jail statute when the statute does not appear to be vague or
uncertain noting that the doctrine "was 'developed to aid in determining the intent of
legislation where meaning is obscure or uncertain.'" Id.; see also, Great Salt Lake Auth.
v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, 966 (1966).
In light of Jaimez and Perez, in this matter the injury to a jail statute is quite
clear. The legislature did not intend to include a vehicle as a place of confinement within
the context of Section 76-8-418. Jails, prisons and the like are intended to be places of
confinement once an accused person is committed as an inmate. See, Jaimez at 883. A
police vehicle is intended to be used for the transportation of arrested persons, not
confinement of committed inmates. Accord, Clark v. Poulton, 914 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir.
1990) (opined that an arrest and detention in a parole office did not constitute
confinement).
With this information known to the trial court judge, the defendant's
motion to quash should have been granted. The defendant did not cause damage to a jail,
prison or other penal institution.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Beynon has been unjustly charged in this matter. Ms. Beynon's
criminal mischievousness should never have been enhanced to a felony conduct. In this
matter, it would be just and proper for this Court to overturn the felony conviction and
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remand the matter under directions to enter the conviction as a misdemeanor criminal
mischief or disorderly conduct offense.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _T_ day of
February, 2004.
D. BRUCE OLIVER

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 7th day of February, 2004,
I served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the
Appellee in this matter to the following address: Matthew Bates, Office of the Attorney
General, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

^.^L^J^
D. BRUCE OLIVER

Appendix "A"
- Sentence -

2nd District - Farmington Dept COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 021700156 FS

KASEY LYNN BURGESS-BEYNON,
Defendant.
Custody: Own Recognizance

Judge:
Date:

THOMAS L. KAY
April 17, 2003

PRESENT
Clerk:
vickil
Prosecutor: PETERSON, CRAIG T
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): OLIVER, D BRUCE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 2, 1972
Video
Tape Number:
F 127
Tape Count: 125
CHARGES
1. DAMAGE JAILS - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/06/2003 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DAMAGE JAILS a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

JUDGEMENT ENTERED
D A T E J i ^ l ^
Page 1

TIME.

Case No: 021700156
Date:
Apr 17, 2003
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1000.00
$0 .00
$459.46
$1000.00

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$1000.00
$0
$459.46
$1000.00
Plus Interest
Fine payments are to be made to Adult Probation and Court
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
The fine is on stay pending appeal
COMMUNITY SERVICE
Complete 8 0 hour(s) of community service.
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Restitution:
Amount: $767.40 Plus Interest
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 6 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1000.00 which includes the surcharge
Interest may increase the final amount due.

Page 2

Case No: 021700156
Date:
Apr 17, 2003
PROBATION CONDITIONS
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law.
ALCOHOL: Do not use or possess alcoholic beverages or frequent
places where alcohol is the chief item for sale.
DRUGS: Do not use or possess controlled substance or be in the
presence of those who use, possess or distribute controlled
substances.
PROGRAM/TREATMENT: Enter, participate in and complete any program,
counseling or treatment as directed by AP&P.
SEARCH CONSENT: Submit to search of person, premises or vehicle
and seizure of any evidence without a search warrant at the request
of police or probation officer, if they have reasonable cause.
EMPLOYMENT: Obtain and maintain lawful, verifiable, full time
employment.
AP&P CONDITIONS: Complete any other terms or conditions or
probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation agreement.
Complete DNA testing and pay the fee.

hi
^

Dated this ^ M

day of

<{h>&
THOMAS L. KAY/
District C o W t Judge
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Ali Holmes at
801-447-3818 at least three working days prior to the proceeding.
The general information phone number is 801-447-3800.

-K'>,""'/> ****** -" /

Page 3 (last)

Appendix "B"
- Order Denying Motion To Quash -

Craig T. Peterson, #7095
Deputy Davis County Attorney
P.O. Box 618
800 West State Street
FarmingtonUT 84025
Telephone:
(801)451-4300
FAX:
(801)451-4328

APR 1 ? 2X2
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
KASEY L. BURGESS-BEYNON
Defendant.

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO QUASH BINDOVER OR
TO DISMISS FELONY COUNT
Case No. 021700156
Judge: Thomas L. Kay

This matter came before the Court on July 18, 2002, for hearing on Defendant's "Motion
to Quash Bindover or to Dismiss Felony Count." Present were: Kasey L. Burgess-Beynon,
Defendant; D. Bruce Oliver, Counsel for Defendant; and, Michael S. Edwards, Counsel for the
State. The primary issue before the Court being whether or not the police cruiser in which the
defendant was detained qualifies as a "public jail or other place of confinement," under Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-418.
Having heard the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the exhibits, case law, and
statutory law, the court finds this is a matter of first impression. Further, the Court finds that the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-418, specifically "or other place of confinement,"
indicates that the section shall apply to more than just jails. The definition of "confinement"
goes beyond just a physical building, and the focus is on the status of the defendant, not on the
place where defendant is being confined. Therefore, the police cruiser in which the defendant
was being detained after arrest qualifies as a "place of confinement" under the statute.
The motion of defendant is denied.
DATED April 17, 2003.

THOMAS L,
Judge

Appendix "C"
- Motion To Quash Bindover -

D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER
OR TO DISMISS FELONY COUNT

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

KASEY L. BURGESS-BEYNON,
Defendant.

Case No. 021700156
Judge Thomas L. Kay

Defendant, Kasey Burgess-Beynon, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver,
and hereby moves this Honorable Court for an order quashing the former bindover of the
felony count (Count I) Damaging a Jail, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1953, as amended). In
the alternative, for a dismissal of said count. The basis for this motion is that Defendant at no
time has caused any injury to a jail or other facility1 within the Legislature's meaning of a
"place of confinement."

The defendant relies on the cases Stale v Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1991):
State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); and State v. Perez, 999 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct.
App. 2000).

This motion is filed pursuant to the Exclusionary Rule, and is supported by
Section 76-8-418 of the Utah Code, Article I, Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 24 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Said motion
is further supported by the accompanying memorandum, which is incorporated herein and
annexed hereto by this reference.2
In this matter, the defendant is likely to prevail on the merits of this case and
said motion is in no way adverse to the public interest. Moreover, the people's interests in
preserving the rights, privileges and immunities claimed in this matter outweigh the
governments' claim to prosecute.
DATED this 20th day of June, 2002.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

The Defense reserves the right to supplement briefing after a hearing on this issue.
z

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION,
postage prepaid, to: Mel Wilson, Davis County Attorney's Office, 800 West State Street, P.O.
Box 618, Farmington, Utah 84025.
Dated this 20th day of June, 2002.

fj^hJrWj^,
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D.Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER
OR TO DISMISS FELONY COUNT

vs.
Case No. 021700156

KASEY L. BURGESS-BEYNON,

Judge Thomas L. Kay

Defendant.

Defendant, Kasey Burgess-Beynon, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver,
and hereby SUBMITS this memorandum of points and authorities in support of her Motion To
Quash Bindover.
PREFACE.
Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution reads:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein

guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Id. (Emphasis added).

POINT. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT RELIABLE HEARSAY THAT
DEFENDANT INJURED A JAIL FACILITY.
The injury to a jail statute provides: "A person who willfully and intentionally
breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place
of confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1953, as
amended). The Court of Appeals calls this statute the "'injury to a jail' statute." State v.
Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this matter, the defendant is being charged
with this offense on the claim that she damaged a police vehicle. The claim is not that she
damaged a public jail. The allegation is a stretch-the State prefers this Court to believe that a
police vehicle is somehow to be construed as fitting within The Legislature's intended meaning
of "other place of confinement."
The Court of Appeals stated in State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App.
1991)1 that the statutory language includes "any damage to the facility" within the plain
meaning of "injury." Id., at 827; State v. Perez, 999 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
1

Jaimez interpreted the injury to jail statute.
2

In Perez, the Court of Appeals specifically rejected using the doctrine of
ejusdem generis to interpret the injury to a jail statute when the statute does not appear to be
vague or uncertain noting that the doctrine "was 'developed to aid in determining the intent of
legislation where meaning is obscure or uncertain.'" Id.; see also, Great Salt Lake Auth. v.
Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, 966 (1966).
In this matter, the injury to a jail statute is quite clear. The legislature did not
intend to include a vehicle as a place of confinement within the context of Utah Code Ann. §
76-8-418. Jails, prisons and the like are intended to be places of confinement once an accused
person is committed as an inmate. See, Jaimez at 883. A police vehicle is intended to be used
for the transportation of arrested persons, not confinement of committed inmates. Accord,
Clark v. Poulton, 914 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1990) (opined that an arrest and detention in a
parole office did not constitute confinement).

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to quash
the bind-over, or in the alternative, to dismiss the felony count (regarding U.C.A. § 76-8-418
(1953, as amended).
DATED this 20th day of June, 2002.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM, postage prepaid, to: Mel Wilson, Davis County Attorney's Office, 800
West State Street, P.O. Box 618, Farmington, Utah 84025.
Dated this 20th day of June, 2002.
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Appendix "D"
- Memorandum In Opposition To Motion -

Michael S. Edwards, #8571
Deputy Davis County Attorney
P.O. Box 618
800 West State Street
FarmingtonUT 84025
Telephone: (801)451-4300
FAX:
(801)451-4328
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH
BINDOVER OR TO DISMISS FELONY
COUNT

KASEY L. BURGESS-BEYNON
Defendant.
Case No. 021700156
Judge: Thomas L. Kay

The State of Utah, through Michael S. Edwards, Deputy Davis County Attorney, hereby
submits its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover or to Dismiss
Felony Count. The basis for the State's opposition is that the plain wording of the statute in
question is broad enough to encompass damage to a police car, where the defendant is being
detained in the police car after her arrest.
ARGUMENT
As the Court is aware, the allegation against the defendant, on Count One of the State's
Information, is that she is guilty of "Damaging a Jail," because she kicked one of the windows
out of a police car, after she was arrested, handcuffed and confined in the vehicle by Officer
Cody Olsen. The defendant's memorandum alleges that the State did not provide "reliable
hearsay that defendant injured a jail facility." The defendant is correct, the State did not rely on
reliable hearsay in any way at the preliminary hearing of this case. What was presented was the
1

testimony of two officers who were involved in the defendant's arrest, who were present on the
scene, heard the window shatter and observed the broken glass around the police car. Officers
Olsen and Adams both testified to these facts, and further testified that there were no other
persons in, on or about the police car when the window was shattered. They deduced from these
facts that the defendant is the person who broke the car window. So the defendant is correct, the
State did not present reliable hearsay, it presented direct testimony of witnesses on the scene.
The defendant urges the Court to interpret the "Damaging Jails"1 statute narrowly, such
that, as a matter of law, the statute only covers damage done to "[j]ails, prisons and the like."
The State simply asks the Court to apply the plain language of the statute to determine whether it
would include the conduct committed by the defendant in this case. See State v. Jaimez, 817
P.2d 822, 826 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) and Utah Code Annotated §76-1-106.
Utah Code Annotated §76-6-418 states: "A person who willfully and intentionally breaks
down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of
confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree." (emphasis added). There is no question in
this case that the defendant damaged the police car after she had been arrested, placed in
handcuffs and confined inside the car. The only issue the Court must decide is: whether a police
car with a handcuffed arrestee confined inside it is an "other place of confinement." If it is, there
is probable cause that the defendant has violated Utah Code Annotated §76-8-418, and the
defendant's motion must be denied. For the following reasons, the State asks the Court to find
that a police car is an "other place of confinement."
The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature meant this section to apply
to more than just jails. If the legislature only intended this "Damaging Jails" section to apply to

1

Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418.

2

jails and prisons, they would have worded the section to reflect that narrow intent. The very
words "or other place of confinement" indicate that the legislature intended to make it a felony
for a person in custody to damage the place they are being confined in, regardless of the specific
label attached to that "place of confinement." Where, as here, the defendant is confined in a
police car, pending transportation to the jail, the police car is as much a "place of confinement"
as is the jail. It is a place where the defendant is being held against her will, until the charges
against her are adjudicated. The plain wording of the statute should be read to include police
cars, in circumstances such as this.
The Court can also look to statutory definitions for help in determining what the
legislature meant when it said "or other place of confinement." The legislature did not define
"place of confinement" in Utah Code Annotated §76-8-418, or anywhere else in part four of Title
76, Chapter Eight. However, "confinement" is defined in Utah Code Annotated §76-8309(7)(a)2 as follows:
"Confinement" means the prisoner is:
(i)
housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a contract with the
Utah Department of Corrections after being sentenced and committed and
the sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on
parole;
(ii)
lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or sentencing or housed in a
county jail after sentencing and commitment and the sentence has not been
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole; or
(iii)
lawfully detained following arrest.
Under the definition of "confinement" used in this statute, the defendant was in a place of
confinement, because she was being lawfully detained following her arrest. The Court should
consider this as it works to determine whether a police car is a "place of confinement," though
this definition is not specifically applied to the statutory section we are analyzing.

Utah Code Annotated §76-8-309 is the "Escape and Aggravated Escape" section.

3

Also instructive on this issue is the definition of "confinement" in Black's Law
Dictionary. The Sixth Edition defines "confinement" as: "State of being confined; shut in;
imprisoned; detention in penal institution. Confinement may be by either a moral or a physical
restraint, by threats of violence with a present force, or by physical restraint of the person."
Applying this definition to the case at hand, where the defendant was placed in handcuffs in a
police car after arrest, the police car was used to confine (i.e. shut in) the defendant, by physical
restraint of her person. Thus, by force of logic and common sense, the police car was a "place of
confinement," and the Court should so rule.
The defendant cites State v. Jaimez? and State v. Perez,4 to support her argument.
However, these cases are not on point. The issue in Jaimez was whether or not a certain room in
the jail fell within the wording of the statute. This clearly does not answer the question presently
before the court. The issue in Perez was whether certain damage to a jail cell was sufficient to
fall within the statute's prohibition. Once again, this does not assist the Court in deciding the
issue at hand.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and arguments, the State respectfully asks the Court to
deny the defendant's motion.
DATED June 24, 2002.

Michael S. Edwards
Deputy Davis County Attorney

J
4

817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
200 U T App 65, 999 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).

4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I certify that I faxed an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover or to Dismiss Felony Count to D. Bruce
Oliver, Attorney for Defendant, (801) 595-0300 on June 24, 2002.

ecretary

5

Appendix "E"
- Transcript of Oral Arguments -

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,^VISX£XMTY
P3K

STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON QOURT
AUG 2 0 2003
STATE OF UTAH,

Case No

P.CLC

3OURI

Appellate Case No. 20030454-CA

Plaintiff,

KASEY LYNN BURGESS-BEYNON,
Defendant.
MOTION TO QUASH HEARING JULY 18, 2002
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE THOMAS L. KAY

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 E.Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

.-

FILE

D

Lttah Court of Appeals

OCT 2 h 2003
Pauiete Stagg
Cterk of the Court

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

MICHAEL S. EDWARDS
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY

For the Defendant:

D. BRUCE OLIVER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
* * *

1

FARMINGTON, UTAH; FRIDAY, JULY 18, 2002

2
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3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT:

The last matter now is State of Utah vs.

5

Kasey Lynn Burgess-Beynon.

Mr. Oliver, we just took the

6

not-guilty plea of the other Mr. Oliver and set this for a

7

pretrial on September 5th at 1:00 p.m.

8

MR. OLIVER: Good afternoon, Your Honor, I apologize.

9

I had a hearing at 1:45 in Salt Lake that was supposed to be a

10

half an hour, and Commissioner Casey just, I just barely got

11

out and I apologize.

12

THE COURT:

13

of 1:00 p.m. work for everyone?

I really apologize for being late.
Okay.

Well, does the September 5th date

14

MR. OLIVER: Let me check real quick, Your Honor.

15

MR. EDWARDS:

16

All right for the State, your Honor.

(inaudible).

17

MR. OLIVER:

Yeah.

We need to get some additional

18

police reports and so forth, Your Honor.

19

see.

22

Well, let's

Yes, I think it will work.

20
21

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay.

September 5th, then, Thursday at

1:00 p.m.
Okay.

Now we're here on State of Utah vs. Kasey Lynn

23

Burgess-Beynon, and this is the time set for a motion hearing.

24

The motion is to quash the bind-over or to dismiss the felony

25

count, and there's been a memorandum supporting the motion to
1

1

quash the bind-over and to dismiss the felony countr and then

2

there's been a memorandum in opposition to that, and I've read

3

all of those.

4

MR. OLIVER:

And, your Honor, may I approach?

5

have a copy of an exhibit.

6

THE COURT: Yes.

7

MR. OLIVER:

8

I just

What this is, your Honor, is just a list

of the statutory provisions that we reference.

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. OLIVER:

11

new with that.

12

we reference.

Oh, okay.
So that's all that is.

There's nothing

It's just a printed copy of the statutes that

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. OLIVER:

Okay.
There's one additional statute, your

15

Honor, that I'd like to refer the Court to, and that's 76-8 and

16

it's actually in connection with the one that the State

17

responded to, and it's just going to take me one second to find

18

it, but the 76-8-3 that he was talking about with regard to the

19

definition of — in the escape.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. OLIVER:

22

MR. EDWARDS: Does it say dash 3 on 7(a) -

23

MR. OLIVER:

76-8-3?
No.

I didn't finish it off.

And I was trying to grab my book, and I

24

was stumbling through it.

It's 76-8-309, and he's quoted the

25

definition 7(a) and so forth.

Now on this, the first thing I'd
2

1

like the Court to realize, and I think that Mr. Edwards does

2

point it out in his memorandum, that this definition is for

3

this part, and it starts off specifically "For purposes of this

4

part," and then it gives a definition of confinement as it

5

pertains to escape and aggravated escape.

6

But I'd like to reference this particular section as

7

an example of the very things that we've talked about

8

previously or in my memorandum and the statutes that we've

9

provided by way of example, and that's in (b), 7(b) where it

10

says "Official Custody.'7

And it says:

11

"Official custody means arrest, whether

12

with or without a warrant, or confinement in

13

a state prison, jail, institution for secure

14

confinement of juvenile offenders, or any

15

confinement purpose pursuant to an order of

16

the court or sentenced and committed to the -

17

and the sentence has not been terminated

18

or voided, or the prisoner is not on parole."

19

A person is considered confined within the state if

20

he — and I think that that last sentence — I've read that

21

several times — goes on, and I'm not sure how that reads

22

smoothly because it doesn't make sense as I read the following

23

couple of paragraphs, because it talks about escaping, but it

24

says a person is considered confined in the state prison if he,

25

and then goes on.

1

So what we have there, your Honor, is in the code

2

referenced by the State, they have cited this definition of

3

confinement, but then in (b) under 7 it goes on to state

4

official custody means arrest, whether with or without a

5

warrant, then says "or confinement/' and then goes on and

6

defines more specifically what confinement is and talks about a

7

facility under authority of the court and things of that

8

nature.

9

And it's our position that the statute is called

10

damage to jails.

11

fact, when you look in the beginning, and I recognize the

12

headings are not necessarily controlling, except case law also

13

states it that way.

14

Chapter 8, Offenses Against the Administration of Government,

15

and when you down through, when you read in part 4, Offenses

16

Against Public Property, and then it goes on down through, and

17

when it comes to 76-8-418, it says damaging jails.

18

It's referenced that way.

As a matter of

But when you look at the beginning of

So all of the concepts that I can find are covered by

19

the fact that the damaging jails that is intended there has to

20

do with physical facilities and secure confinement facilities

21

as well, and so I think that as I had argued before and

22

mentioned to the court, I think ejusdem generis, as I can see

23

it, both in 76-8-418 and all of the other provisions, they

24

suggest that indeed it is more than just being arrested and

25

transported in a police car from the arrest scene.
4

1

Now, there's two last things that I want to point

2

out.

3

just get the right citation here.

4

1361, it's Clark

5

Poltonr

6

a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case.

7

in reality, the dissent, Judge Seymour in the dissent, actually

8

embraces the thought put on by the State, where the majority

9

opinion indicates that confinement has got to be met with

10

Utah

State

v.

Polton.
Corrections

In - let me

In a 1992 case, 963 F.2d

It's James
Department,

Edward
et

Clark
al.r

v.

Robert

and this is

And dealing with this

certain —

11
12

Let me just get the right citation here.

THE COURT:

Well, what were the facts?

What was

being confined or the place of confinement in that case.

13

MR. OLIVER:

It was the state prison, and it was

14

dealing with pretrial detention, things of that nature.

And

15

what the court — I'll be happy to give the Court a copy of the

16

case.

17

May I approach?

I've only have one, and I'll let you take a look at it.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. OLIVER:

Sure.
What the court ruled was that for

20

confinement purposes that there must be due-process

21

protections, and so they go through, and what they determine is

22 ' that there is a difference between being in custody, being
23

arrested, and how you're confined, and they indicate for

24

confinement to be in effect that there must be due-process

25

protections, and it's our position that that's what all of
5

1

these statutes that we have in the state of Utah indicates care

2

confinement, places of confinement.

3

place if after sentence.

4

they can be sentenced to home confinement. So these are the

5

types of things that confinement suggests, as opposed to a

6

police car when a person's first arrested.

7

Even home confinement is a

And so when a person is sentenced,

Now, that doesn't mean that a person can damage a

8

police car and walk.

I mean you have criminal mischief to

9

cover that, and it is there to be covered.

So the state does

10

not go — or the city, as the case may be — does not go

11

unprotected, and it does have a means of, A, charging and, B,

12

recovering damages, as the case may be.

13

to be responsible for that, but the circumstances are that even

14

in the 76-8-418, - excuse me, 76-8-418, sorry - where the —

15

when the damaging jail statute was modified by the legislature,

16

it also modified juvenile provisions and was very specific

17

talking about secure confinement and talking about those types

18

of provisions.

19

A person can be held

And so it's our position that the word confinement

in

20

76-8-418 is exemplified by the examples, or is exemplified by

21

the words contained within the statute, and then ejusdem

22

generis goes on to show that indeed what we're talking about is

23

physical facilities, secure confinement locations, jails,

24

prisons, and things of that nature, where a person can be

25

sentenced to as a result of court action.
6

1

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

2

Mr. Edwards?

3

MR. EDWARDS:

4

Your Honor, first I'd like to refer the Court, as I

Thanks, your Honor.

5

did in my memorandum, to Section 76-1-106.

I think that really

6

provides the starting point to the Court for how each statute

7

is to be interpreted.

8

just refer the Court to that in consideration as I make my

9

argument, because I think the Court — that section and all the

If the Court has that in front of itl'll

10

case law the Court's supposed to first give statutory section

11

in plain wording.

12

motion if the Court finds that a place of confinement is a term

13

of art that only means places like jails and prisons.

I think the Court can only grant defendant's

14

And, your Honor, the fascinating thing for me, if

15

that is the case, is the very wording of 76-6-418 names any

16

public jail or other place of confinement.

17

detail and delineate each place that might qualify.

18

your Honor, I think the plain wording of that, as I argued in

19

my memorandum, is that it can mean other places.

20

It doesn't go into
And so,

Really the more appropriate focus is on the status of

21

the defendant rather than on the label attached to the place

22

where the defendant is.

23

confined, then the place where they are is a fact of a place of

24

confinement, and if they cause damage to that place, they have

25

violated Section 76-6-418.

In other words, if a person is being

7

1

It's interesting, your Honor, if you look at the — I

2

just looked briefly at the statutory sections that Mr. Oliver

3

has provided for us, and in the juvenile court amendments they

4

didn't specifically define exactly what a place of confinement

5

was to mean, although it did word it generally such as a place

6

of confinement includes X and Y.

7

necessarily a mutually exclusive list.

8

little better than this statute did.

9

It didn't say that that was
It did spell it out a

So, your Honor, that's the position of the State.

10

Once again, I think all the other case law from our state has

11

not been on point.

12

of first impression before the Court.

13

things we've already included in our memorandum without

14

repeating them, as far as the persuasive authority of 76-8-309,

15

sub 7(a), and Black's

16
17

This is, as far as I'm concerned, an issue
We would argue the

Law definition of confinement.

But, your Honor, barring any questions of the Court,
that will be my argument.

18

THE COURT:

All right.

19

MR. EDWARDS:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. EDWARDS:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. OLIVER: No, Your Honor - well, just very briefly.

Do you have any questions?

No.
Thank you.

Any reply?

24

I think that just referring to 76-1-106, I think indeed that's

25

correct, but there is statutory construction, and one can taLk
8

1

about statutory construction.

2

name of the case.

3

meaning, ejusdem generis is that which helps us to do that, and

4

what ejusdem generis means, your Honor — and I recognize,

5

because the Court said previously that it's familiar with the

6

doctrine, I'm not going to belabor that — is that the specific

7

defines the general.

8
9

And I'm trying to remember the

It states that we like to go with plain

So when we have specific wordings in a statute, and
then a general word, that general word is defined in connection

10

with the context of the specific, and that's what we have in

11

this particular case, under 76-8-418, that enumerates specific

12

— and for general reference, I'm just going to call it real

13

property locations, and it starts off and it names that, and

14

then goes to the general. And the reason it goes to the

15

general is because there's other places that the person can be

16

confined other than just specifically a ;jail. And it says

17

here —

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. OLIVER:

Well, what are those places?
Well, you could have a halfway house.

20

You could have a rehab center that you're sentenced to as a

21

result of something.

It could be the jail - or excuse me, it

22

could be the prison.

It could be — as a matter of fact, I'm

23

not sure that this would be applicable, but even under home

24

confinement that may be something that is applicable if indeed

25

it's done with maliciousness and because of confinement.
9

1

I imagine under the definition that that indeed could

2

happen, but that's what is defined and shown in the other

3

juvenile proceedings, because in there — in the juvenile

4

provisions - excuse me.

5

they give you some examples of some, and that's where the

6

juvenile statutes are instructive specifically to this case

7

because it says — I'll just read one.

8
9

There they expand a little bit, and

It says:

"A child who willfully and intentionally
damages a jail or other place of confinement is

10

provided in 76-8-14, including a detention

11

shelter or secure confinement facility operated

12

by the Division of Youth Corrections."

13

So there it gives three additional places, and it

14

does that in several other places of the juvenile court - in

15

the juvenile proceedings.

16

well, so there are other places that the judicial system can

17

place people under sentence that this is intended to cover, and

18

not just the jail, but other places pursuant to sentence that

19

the court has the right to place a person in.

One of the things that it talks —

20

And what they're saying is, as long as you're here

21

under the court's auspices, don't damage it, and that's what

22

they're talking about.

23

facility it is as long as it's a place of confinement or

24

[unintelligible].

25

THE COURT:

And it doesn't make any difference what

Okay.

Thank you.

10

1

Okay, I have reviewed through these memoranda before

2

the argument, as I mentioned.

3

argument of counsel, and I believe that what was (inaudible) is

4

accurate.

5

law, and secondly, that it's really a question of first

6

impression.

7

that has interpreted this beyond or to these circumstances that

8

are in this case.

9

I've also listened to the

This is a matter — I mean this issue is a matter of

We don't have any case law in the state of Utah

However, having said that, so that whatever I do

10

could be basically appealed, saying that it's a matter of law.

11

There's not any discretionary review; it's a question of

12

whether it's right or wrong.

13

appellate courts to let us know if it's right or wrong.

14

my best judgment, but then only the appellate courts can really

15

say for the state whether that's accurate and states the law.

16

It's really, I believe, for the
I did

But based upon the cases that I've read prior to

17

this, the statutes that have been shown to me, I'm going to

18

deny the motion to quash the bind-over and deny the motion to

19

dismiss the felony count.

20

that the word confinement

21

building, and where a person is confined to mean a place of

22

confinement.

I do this basically for the reasons
I see goes beyond just a physical

23

So in light of that ruling, I mean that's something

24

that could be clearly appealed in the future if that's wrong,

25

but that's my best judgment.

So in light of that, I think we
11

1

need to set this matter for a pretrial, or if you want to

2

discuss pretrial issues today, whatever you wish tc do.

3

MR. OLIVER:

Your Honor, I think that we would ask -

4

and I have not had the opportunity to discuss with

5

Ms. Burgess-Beynon what I'm about to say, and so I'm asking in

6

a general broad - in a general context without specific desire

7

one way or another.

8

case, and the Court may well do that, if we took an interloc on

9

it.

But it might be well in this particular

And so if we could set, say, a pretrial out a month, give

10

Ms. Burgess-Beynon the opportunity — which I think we have to

11

do the interlocutory within two weeks, but I'm sure.

12

deadline on the interloc.

13

goes on forever.

14

an order prepared, and then we have to do the request for an

15

interloc within a period of time.

16
17

There's a

So it's not an open-ended thing that

I think we have to do it, and there has to be

So I would just ask that we set it out, maybe the
same day as Mr. Oliver's.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. EDWARDS:

Did you have any objection to that?
I mean the other option is to do a plea

20

agreement conditioned on your right to appeal (inaudible)

21

decide which strategically (inaudible).

22

MR. OLIVER:

But if we filed an interloc, there may

23

be a period of time before the court accepts it, but we'll

24

definitely know by then whether or not an interloc is going to

25

be filed, what the direction we want to take if -- and it ma/ be

12

1

that we may do a [unintelligible] plea.

2

possibility, but don't know at this point in time.

3

discussed those options with Ms. Burgess-Beynon.

4

could schedule this for the same day as Mr. Oliver, at least

5

we'd know —

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. EDWARDS:

8

THE COURT:

9

I mean that may be a
I've not
So if we

Is there any objection to that?
I don't have any.
Then we'll set this for September 5th at

1:00 p.m. for a pretrial, and then you do whatever you're going

10

to do before then, whether you're going to appeal it at this

11

point or appeal it on a plea that would condition your plea to

12

your rights to the appeal.

13

MR. OLIVER:

Okay.

I think one of the reasons why

14

I'm at least thinking interloc is because it is dispositive

15

question.

16

THE COURT:

As to that count.

17

MR. OLIVER:

18

THE COURT: Right.

19

MR. OLIVER:

Yeah.

Well, that's the major count.

And the Court of Appeals will oftentimes

20

take a case on interloc if indeed it is dispositive.

21

it's a crucial thing — I mean if we do the trial and then we do

22

the appeal, or something like that, it's a waste of time.

23

THE COURT:

Yeah.

And if

I don't have any problem with

24

somebody resolving the issue prior to us going to trial.

25

Whichever way you want to do it, but if that's what you want to

13

1

do, then go ahead and do that.

Okay, thank you.

2

MR. OLIVER:

3

(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)

Thank you, your Honor.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

-c14

CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript
in the before mentioned hearing held before Judge Thomas
Kay was transcribed by me from a videotape and
is a full, true, and correct transcription of the
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best
of my ability.
Signed this 10th day of August, 2003 in Sandy,
Utah.

Carolyn Eyickson
Certified Shorthand Reporter
Certified Court Transcriber
My Commission expires May 4, 2006

